Party within a State or State within a Party- Part II: The battle for the soul of the RPF

 

“There is no single model for nation-building. At the root of any success are good choices, built on a mindset which can be summarised in three words: Do It Yourself.”                                   RPF Chairman, Paul Kagame, August 18, 2017.

Introduction:

The Rwandese Patriotic Front is a political movement born out of the liberation struggle in Rwanda few years before the end of the cold war in 1987. Its origins are deeply rooted in Rwandese culture, hence its name Inkotanyi, and anti-imperialism as evidenced by the confrontation against France before, during and after the genocide against Tutsis. Unlike other liberation movements, such as the ANC, the RPF spent more days in government than in the struggle, only 15 years after its creation. Nonetheless, the RPF had inherited grievances as old as 27 years by the time of its creation.

The early entry into government, however, has created a unique legacy whereby the weight of the administration played a central role in how the RPF reconciles divergent policy opinions. Whereas political movements with late entry into government develop a higher sense of ideology, those with early entry into government are more pragmatic. The RPF has quickly appropriated administration tools to develop policies, instead of party commission analyzing policies in the prism of party ideology; policies are preceded by studies developed by technocrats. The RPF has actually embraced performance based management system, imihigo, as methodology to judge the loyalty of its cadres. This trend has been reinforced by the reluctance of RPF to allow the formation of ‘historicals without accountabality’ like we have seen in Uganda’s NRM. The discipline within RPF is measured in real time and not in the rearview of past achievements.

There are policy choices however, which are not always easily settled through scientific studies. Such policies are related to societal choices with an open ended debate. Critics of RPF often argue that there is no debate within RPF and Rwanda in general, they argue that those questions are settled through hierarchal power. Such view is very problematic as it assumes a mechanical society of people without opinions. It borrows from pre-determinism by assuming that all policy choices can be subject to a single minded ‘order from above’. It is an avatar of the myth of ‘cohesion by oppression’ which prevails since 19th century, itself grounded in the constant refusal of African agency.

 In reality, there is a lot of debate within RPF reflecting the divergent opinions of its cadres. Whereas some societies are paralyzed by social policy issues such as racism and migration, Rwanda has had a quite disproportionate share of complex policy issues to decide upon: unity and reconciliation, death penalty, distribution of land after exile and displacement to name but a few. This article aims to shed a light on how RPF has over the years settled divergent political opinions.

While Party within a State or State within a Party- Part I focused on RPF versus the opposition, this article focuses more on policy debates within the RPF. It identifies two tension points: conservatism (I) and progressivism (II). The article identifies four variables explaining policy shifts within RPF, consensus, pragmatism attributed to conservative policy choices as well as culture inspired and technology led innovation explain progressive policy choices. The underlying political dynamics are often complex. For example, what has informed progressiveness in Rwanda is culture and what has informed conservatism is consensus building.

I. Conservatism within RPF: The bitter taste of consensus

Conservative policy choices within RPF are informed by consensus (A) to unite all political trends within the movement and pragmatism (B) when dealing with unprecedented political issues or indiscipline.

A. Consensus: From reconciliation policies to legalized abortion

The RPF had been started by refugees who, when they came back, had to renounce their old properties and accommodate those who had killed their relatives. Unlike genocide survivors, refuges were not entitled to government financial assistance yet they had suffered similar onslaught in 1959, 1963 etc. There was no compensation for parents who lost their children on the front liberating the country from genocidal government. The home coming for the founding RPF cadres was bitter to say the least. Yet this consensus, allowed the RPF to have the moral high-ground to ask concessions from all sections of the Rwandan society. Against this background, one can only wonder how people think of RPF as dictatorial decision making machine, if that was the case then why didn’t the RPF enforced choices that were much more comfortable for its cadres?

The search for consensus was inbuilt during the liberation struggle, as the organization relied on volunteering and sacrifice. Consensus also enable to unify all parties in exile within one single movement, this had implications that can be felt today: people like Theogene Rudasingwa or Seth Sendashonga had their own political formations and ambitions, their divorce with RPF was therefore not a surprise to those who recruited them.

Consensus became the preferred method of policy making in post-genocide Rwanda as confrontational politics had not borne any positive outcomes in the 1950s and again in the 1990s. Like any society, Rwanda is composed of people with divergent policy preferences, for example, some are of the view that abortion should be legalized others wants it to be penalized. After intensive debates, the middle ground was reached by a hard won consensus: abortion remains penalized except in case of rape or medical grounds. The debate on abortion revealed the big difference between common assumptions and political reality. Prominent amongst the anti-abortion lobby were female politicians. I remember discussing with one female Member of Parliament about this topic: she was of the opinion that the punishment for abortion should be life imprisonment!

Consensus as decision making procedure comes of course with the negative externality of endless meetings and rounds of consultations. It is again baffling when some suggest decision making in Rwanda is top-down yet the country is always in meetings. The best proof of consensus policy making in Rwanda is the Urugwiro Debates from May 1998 to March 1999, where opinion makers, academics and political parties came together to discuss Rwanda’s future, the recommendations were translated into the policies we see today.

This culture of consensus also has a big consequence on the style of policy makers, it favors discrete honest brokers instead of media savvy straight shooters. This inevitably makes political life in Rwanda less sensationalist as it favors technocrats with astute networking skills. It is also true that culturally, Rwandans view opinioned outbursts as lack of self-mastery. Thus, consensus is the default-mode of policy making within RPF and it will remain so for the foreseeable time to come due to its effectiveness in uniting the country around a single developmental vision.

B. Pragmatism: Success is what numbers say not norms

Pragmatism is deeply rooted in RPF’s DNA. Whoever lived in exile knows how refugees do not have an accurate perception of reality. They tend to indulge in wishful thinking, forever hoping for a sudden turn of events which will bring them home. RPF cadres grew up with parents who were hopelessly nostalgic. They witnessed the failure of previous attempts to go home either through communist rebels or through the UN. There is a deep distrust amongst RPF cadres about any romanticized view of the reality. Thus, it is not a surprise that one of the first big policy decisions by RPF was to advocate for a new Republic of Rwanda instead of an attempt to restore the old monarchy. This decision was big as it run contrary to the dogma of all post-independence nationalistic leaning political views, yet RPF was claiming to be a patriotic political formation. RPF first political pragmatic decision was to redefine the sense of patriotism to fit Rwanda into the reality of post-colonial context.

RPF pragmatism is best illustrated in its original 8 point program outlining its policy objectives. It is a sober and pragmatic list of priorities deprived of any fanfare. The same spirit can be found in ceremonies around 4th July, where the Chairman often asks why Rwanda had to be liberated in the first place instead of reminiscing the glorious days of the struggle.

RPF’s pragmatism played a big role in the security sector where RPF had unprecedented challenges related to absorbing armed forces who just committed genocide. For example, the army decided to integrate or demobilize combatants from the previous regime instead of marginalizing them. The result is the difference between Iraq and Rwanda today. Post-conflict nation building happened with only one yardstick: does it work?

The RPF does not require its cadres to recite norms of the party doctrine but they are required at any time to quantify their work. Measuring progress instead of indoctrination has led to un-conservative policy preferences. For example, if distributing condoms to Homosexual communities reduces the rate of HIV, then the Ministry of Health would do so, irrespective of the controversy around homosexuality. The RPF also decided not to criminalize but not to promote homosexuality as well. It would have been extremely tempting to indulge in the populism around homosexuality in Africa, yet the RPF decided pragmatically to stay in the middle ground. Another example is the introduction of incineration of bodies in a country with Christian majority or the use of marijuana for palliative care. Many of those programmatic policy choices involved strong engagement with the Christian and born again lobby, which arguably enjoys majority in parliament. The RPF was able to unite all confessions in the movement by skillfully balancing the rights of Christians, Muslims in the share of public holidays and appointments in public office. There is however a tension point between a pragmatic-consensus leading to conservative policy choices such as the penalization of adultery and the RPF doctrine which emphasizes structuralism and progressiveness.

Pragmatism has been the preferred policy tool when dealing with issues of discipline within RPF. Recently, a campaign against corruption led to the resignation seven mayors in less than three months because their numbers weren’t literally adding up.  Their membership card did not prevent them from accountability.

Unlike consensus building, pragmatic policy choices need championing cadres because they are more the result of boldness than consultations. When for example, RPF saw land management as the only way to achieve food-security; it had to take the courage of Paul Kagame to start redistributing land owned by Generals. Curiously, the same land grabbing generals are the ones we see today claiming to be bona fide opposition like Kayumba Nyamwasa.

We have seen how consensus drives RPF conservative policy options with the objective to unite all cadres, while pragmatism sometimes drives RPF at the edge of its doctrine, it often also drives conservatism at its edge.

II. Culture led innovation: The sweet taste of revenge

RPF the youth party reconciled with the old Rwandan culture through home-grown solutions (A) but adopted disruptive technologies to catch up with the future (B).

A. Home-Grown Innovations: Towards a sense of African Modernity

As patriotic party, culture has always played a big role within RPF especially with regards to mobilization. However, it’s consensual and pragmatic approach did not allow for culture to become a dogmatic source of policy. Rather culture served as fixation point on the map to enable orientation, without dictating the direction of policies. It is a firm belief within RPF that “Rwanda was independent and had its own culture, which was the uniting factor for all her people” before colonialism. But at first, RPF did not indulge in defining cultural cannons for fear of losing the main objective out of sight which wasn’t ideological purity but the recovery of sovereignty.

The exile had enabled cultural groups to be out of reach of the cultural revisionism of the parmehutu ideology, who at one time even forbid certain dances, redesigned the grammar and renamed regions. RPF’s pragmatism did not allow for rebirth of the old names, rather provinces were simply called North/South/West/East. Indeed, amongst RPF culture fans, it seemed like the pragmatism was becoming too much when RPF preferred dance troops composed of citizens to dance troops composed of professional dancers during events.

Culture, however, made a big come back when RPF realized it could use culturally inspired policies to effectively mobilize the population to solve daunting challenges such as the post-genocide accountability through Gacaca jurisdictions and the restoration of community mediators Abunzi. Under the banner of home-grown solutions, new policies were re-discovered by closely interacting with villagers who were still harboring a collective memory of ancient practices and institutions like the Ubudehe and Igihango at the origin of one cow per family program. RPF technocrats added some modern management tools to those policies and thereby created a sense of African modernity.

Culturally inspired institutions started in rural development policies but have now embraced urban areas through the Intore corporations. Intore concept can be compared to a guild organizing professional associations or citizen sharing a structural common interest. The Imihigo performance contracts have also been used to drive exports through joint imihigo with the private sector.

Over the years, cultural practitioners have seen their fate turning from marginalization to prominence. It is now possible to live comfortably from arts, the arts college in Nyundo was revamped and artists are present in every public function. Citizens across the country have revived the old art of Umuvugo, contemporary poems filled with humor and irony. The Chairman himself does not leave a major speech without reference to the Rwandan culture, especially at the beginning of the year during National Payer’s Breakfast or at Rwanda Days.

There are other culturally grounded policies such as constitutional empowerment of women. As the Chairman Paul Kagame often says, RPF was founded to fight injustice, he personally led the gender revolution first during the struggle then in government. The old memories of female Chiefs and Queen Mothers had been lost through colonial legislation and misogynic parmehutu ideology as evidenced by the infamous Hutu Power Ten Commandments which specifically targeted women.

Culture based policy making is now firmly anchored in RPF’s toolbox, as evidenced by the Article 11 of the new 2015 Constitution that consecrated culture as source of policy. Given the onslaught on culture by colonialism and subsequent governments, the coming back of culture is a miracle. It is fascinating to see that Rwanda, like Asian countries, is developing a unique style of government with culturally inspired political practices.  In doing so, RPF is looking East and not West for growth models which do not imply a total cultural alienation.

B. Technology led innovation: The indictment of complacency

Technology was so important to the current RPF’s chairman that he ordered during the campaign against genocide to quickly protect universities to the extent that the first students after genocide found intact notes and books in class rooms. Kigali’s most important military barrack was turned into Kigali Institute of Technology and the country was set on the path Information and Communication Technology at a time where internet was not a household name in the West.

Technology within RPF is seen as guarantee against the kind of complacency that led to the colonization of Rwanda, whereby people equipped with better technology were able to overrun the existing order, yet they were as human as Rwandans are. The use of technology goes hand in hand with a radical openness to the outside world, liberalized migration policy, and putting Rwanda in all major networks of the world. Chairman Kagame, who joined tweeter in May 2009, understood like no other Rwandan leader before him that Rwanda should no longer be taken by surprise. He has prevented RPF to become an inward looking liberation movement. This openness has triggered policies in the areas of competiveness such the doing business climate and e-government with information technology as enabler.

The focus on technology coupled with pragmatism, has enabled Rwanda to become a proof of concept country for innovations such as drone delivery of drugs or information systems to manage traffic, commodity prices and health applications. Nonetheless, unlike the Ethiopia’s EPRDF, RPF adopted only of recent a real interest into manufacturing. For a long time, RPF cadres considered manufacturing to be a lost cause given Rwanda’s landlocked-ness, market size and low supply of energy. This has changed and now manufacturing is considered as trailblazer for urbanization and structural economic transformation through the Made in Rwanda campaign.

In the adoption of modern policy tools, RPF has looked West for development aid, economic reforms and technology to the surprise of some analysts who see it as contradiction to self-determination. They label Rwanda as darling of the West. This would be however to forget that excellence should be embraced where it is found, Ivy League Universities are filled with students from the East, why should Africa do the contrary?

RPF is a political movement composed of people with different style and preferences united around the objective of restoring dignity to Rwandans. This self-esteem is deeply anchored in Rwanda’s self-perception, a country where God comes to sleep, according to its founding myth. The quest for dignity is a contestation of the prevailing balance of power and implies State capacity to back up this claim. In that sense, RPF accommodates different trends, fights injustices threatening social cohesion and promotes productivity with the core mission of self-determination. This coincides with the apolitical pre-requisite to nationhood. It bears the collective experience of Rwandans that human rights need a capable State to guarantee them. This explains the popularity of RPF as every Rwandan has experienced the consequences of State failure. Whoever wants to compete against RPF should bring better ideas on how best to increase State capacity for self-determination. Otherwise, Rwandans have a 1000 years collective memory of Statehood whose spirit withstood 60 years of colonization, 35 years of post-colonial errancy and genocide. This spirit is one of the most underestimated factors about Rwanda.

RPF has indicted complacency using innovation and technology but most importantly it has indicted the type of African dependency that runs contrary to human dignity. Looking at the amount of energy and thinking required to rise from refugee camp to world stage while turning the World’s worst humanitarian disaster into a success story, the bar set by RPF is so high that it is almost understandable to see critics preferring the shortcut of denial. But can Rwanda afford less?

 

The inter-national blindspot in the crisis of Eastern DRC

Friends and foe of Rwanda agree that peace in DRC, especially in the East, passes through Rwanda. Friends of Rwanda argue that the efficiency of Rwanda’s institutions could leverage the geographic and demographic factors linking both Rwanda and Eastern DRC to infuse a positive outcome of the crisis. Indeed, the Eastern part of DRC host a large community of Rwandophones and needs Rwanda to access regional and world markets. Critics of Rwanda say the problems of DRC are caused by Rwanda and the international community should sanction Rwanda whenever Congo is not at peace. This Congo-conditionality is currently being administered to Rwanda. Both positions are actually grounded on an assumption that needs to be nuanced: the Rwanda factor in the eastern part of DRC is more a people’s question than an international one. The current disarray in the international politics on DRC is explained by the fact that the international community is ill-equipped in dealing with a problem that is not inter-national. This blind-spot has deadly consequences for the communities on the ground.

1.     The blindness of the international community towards  people’s rights

The inter-national community is blind to a people’s driven agenda. The fight for African self-determination was aborted by the AU insistence on colonial borders without providing for strong regional institutions. Yet colonial borders are deadly straightjackets, they were drawn based on a rationale of exploitation. Moreover, the indigenous institutions left by the colonial administration were auxiliary of that exploitation and continued to draw their legitimacy in western capitals rather than within their constituency, considered as backward.  It is without surprise that Africa is home to failed States.

Currently, the population of Eastern DRC with a large community of Rwandophones is perceived to be non-existent in their own right. The only way they are perceived by the international community is through the prism of the nation of Rwanda. Whatever happens in Eastern DRC now is linked to Rwanda, yet the problems call for a regional solution than a nation-centered one. Alternatively, the population of Eastern DRC is linked to the nation of DRC, if it accepts the status of all citizens in DRC: being citizens of a failed State without functioning institutions for security and welfare. The problem is that unlike Congolese in other parts of the DRC, absent institutions for Congolese in the East means direct threats of massacres and massive rape. In other words, the status quo is not tenable, thus the flaring up of conflicts every now and then.

The international community has reacted to this untenable status quo with the largest peacekeeping mission ever, but its blindness towards governance issues has led to trench warfare with various armed groups instead of providing answers to the people’s legitimate aspirations towards peace, security and development.

Regardless of any position on the current situation in Eastern DRC, the situation consists of a continent-country without institutions to protect civilians. In this context, the international community has confined its role in monitoring human rights violations with questionable expertise and objectivity, at occasion the international community actually committed human rights violations.

2.     The ICC as accelerator of conflict

The international community has become part of the problem since it seeks to antagonize concerned administrations within the region without providing for an alternative. Such an alternative would consist of mechanisms to deal with the underlying issues in DRC: absence of institutions to protect and promote development. Instead, the UN Security Council has abandoned state-building reforms in favor of the magic stick of the ICC.

Ironically, the ICC has been justified by the failure of the world in preventing genocide in Rwanda, yet bad governance is what caused genocide in Rwanda not the absence of a tribunal. As one of the most distinguished professor in constitutional law once said, lawyers have no role in revolutions. A legal system, however international, cannot govern the world. A legal system does not mean legitimacy on its own, legitimacy and thus the absence of a conflict is grounded in the will of the people. The current application of ICC politics to conflicts of the world reverses the French Revolution that has institutionalized the will of the people as basis of governance and the post-1945 understanding that power is limited by human rights.

For the apolitical proponents of the ICC, human rights form the basis of power and the will of the people can be ignored to impose an ICC warrant for example. Yet for that to be true, the application of sanctions against human rights violations would have to be universal and not selective. Otherwise, the ICC would be driven by a sectarian political will rather than by the universality of human rights.

Additionally, justice cannot be pronounced in a political vacuum, justice is being pronounced in the name of the people. The current insistence on arresting Bosco Ntanganda has triggered a domino effect with more war than peace, for what is at stake goes beyond his individual responsibility. What is at the stake is to know how security can be achieved in the Eastern part of DRC. As long as there is neither national nor international force able to protect civilians in East DRC there will be people like Bosco Ntaganda. DRC needs institutions to monopolize the legitimate forms of violence.

This does not mean that East Congo should seek secession. Even a secessionist State would have to come to the sobering conclusion that State building does not occur overnight and that the support of the international community is crucial. There is no magic solution for East Congo, but any solution would need to withstand the following test: How does it affect the people in East DRC?

3.     Prioritizing State-building reforms

The international community has sought to impose an arrest warrant at all costs, ignoring the firepower of those who consider that the priority is not arresting Ntaganda but what substantiate his political existence. In doing so, it has chosen a self-flattering initiative over the interests of the population in East DRC. One could blame Ntaganda for making his arrest so costly, the truth is however that the international community has continued to issue arrests warrants against leaders of his community making it clear that they should accept being killed and raped within the institutional vacuum of East DRC or fight for survival. It is this international blindness towards what politically can bring peace and development that is proving to be lethal for the population in East Congo. In a study done by the London School of Economics and PriceWaterhouseCoopers on how donors can avoid doing harm and maximize their positive impact in fragile situations, the authors alludes to this blind spot: ‘Less understood among donors is the extent to which the state’s legitimacy is bolstered by the political reorganisation championed by government’. This study shows how Rwanda was able to recover from the abyss by working with development partners to restore State efficiency. This is what should inform any solution to the crisis in East Congo, what policies are going to establish State efficiency?

In November 2011, countries emerging from conflict met in Kigali under the auspice of the Peace building Commission of the UN, they declared State Building to be the other side of the peace medal. Unfortunately, for the people in East Congo, State Building is not so prone to media attraction like the business of humanitarian interventions.