Fast-tracking EAC integration: Top Down but Citizen Centered

Regional integration is a delicate affair that is why policy makers and scholars alike have invented a whole range of concepts to explain the intricacies involved in the coming together of countries. Among such concept is the notion of variable geometry or multi-speed approach which allows a group of countries in a given regional block to deepen integration without waiting for countries that are not yet willing or able to do so.

Variable Geometry

According to the EAC Treaty, the concept of variable geometry is one of the operational principles of the EAC (article 7) and the EAC Court of Justice (EACJ) has issued a ruling on its scope of application. Whereas the EAC decision making follows the principle of consensus, the EACJ has explained that this does not imply unanimity and that the principle of variable geometry can apply to guide the integration process (Advisory opinion No. 1 of 2008, East African Court of Justice at Arusha  First Instance Division).

Recently, the Republics of Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda decided to deepen their integration agenda in a number of policies already agreed upon within the EAC treaty. A number of Summits were held in Entebbe, Mombasa and Kigali respectively. In a widely commentated speech before the parliament, President Kikwete outlined policy areas of disagreement between the Republic of Tanzania and the other EAC Partner States: “We are concerned about the fast tracking of the integration, land, employment and immigration these are the only aspects we do not agree on.”

In light of this public admission, it appears that the controversy over the breaking up the EAC or the so called coalition of the willing lacks both the factual and legal basis: The President of Tanzania has confirmed that Tanzania is not yet ready to fast-track integration while the EAC Treaty allows other Partner States to do so. The recent legal battle unleashed by Tanzanian lawyers appears therefore to be more a less a distraction rather than a genuine case.

The incentives of fast tracking integration

The Republics of Rwanda and Uganda are both landlocked countries, fast tracking integration will allow reducing cost of doing business at least by 40% (equivalent to the cost of transport). For instance, after the announcement of President Kenyatta to reform the Mombasa port and to abolish some of the non-tariff barriers, the days it took a container to move from Mombasa were reduced from 18 days to 5 days.

The Kenyan government can only benefit from increased traffic at the Mombasa port. The incentives for Burundi and Tanzania ought to be similar. However, some historical legacies impede the embracement for more integration in Tanzania.

Indeed, some items on the agenda of deepening EAC integration do not fall in the jurisdiction of the Republic of Tanzania. According to article 4 of the Tanzanian Constitution, issues relating to political federation, land and employment do not fall in the exhaustive list of Union matters, which means the federal jurisdiction. Incidentally, these are the same issues President Kikwete was referring to in his recent speech before the parliament as issues Tanzania would not want to discuss at EAC level.

This malaise had already been reported in a fact finding mission by EAC experts conducted in Tanzania in 2009: The Mission came to the conclusion that there are problems associated with the formation, structure and management of the Union. Many of these problems remain unresolved and are the basis for the dissatisfaction and grievances on many aspects of the Union including its legality, the two-government structure, the expansion of the list of Union matters, the sharing of Union benefits and costs, the threat to Zanzibar’s identity and international dealing and to some extent the loss of the Tanganyika identity.

The Constitution of Tanzania is currently under review and the above mentioned issues have not yet been all ironed out. Thus, the problem of fast-tracking EAC integration in Tanzania is that it also fast-tracks the above mentioned internal issues. Indeed, none in the Tanzanian leadership wants to spoil the 50^th anniversary of the Union of Tanzania next year by amplifying the existing malaise.

The drivers of integration

There are two main drivers of regional integration: the public and private sector. Undeniably, the East African private sector has played a considerable role in bringing the people of EAC together, albeit with a noticeable domination by Kenyan companies. However, the private sector base within the EAC is still narrow with a large majority of the population still in the informal sector. The private sector can actually not grow within the current fragmented market of the EAC.

As for the public sector, Students of regional integration usually differentiate between the member States of a given regional block and transnational bureaucrats. To be fair, the EAC does not yet have regional bureaucrats with certain autonomy to drive the integration agenda. The EAC Secretariat is still only a secretariat. However, there is poor track record of bureaucrats from Partner States shuttling between the Partner States and making decisions regarding the implementation of the EAC agenda.  Indeed, the incentives for endless workshops, meetings and studies outweigh on a short term those of swift implantation of the EAC agenda. This is because meetings come with per diems, holidays and kick backs paid by hosting hotels. The prospect of regional autonomous bureaucrats will not, with one magic stick, erase these challenges of implementation overnight.

Therefore the current debate on the state of the EAC shouldn’t overlook the crucial question of who are the drivers of regional integration in developing countries. It seems that the Heads of State of Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda have invented a new formula: top-down but citizen centered. All decisions taken within the last Summits of these three countries had immediate effect on the daily lives of ordinary EAC citizens despite originating from the top. Observers of the EAC should critically look at how this new formula will enrich other forms of best practices instead of demonizing it.

After M23 what’s next?

Commentators on the recent events in the Eastern DRC have been quick to announce the end of M23, only few however have analyzed the potential consequences. This contribution aims to fill this gap by asking after M23, what’s next? The End of M23 also means the diffusion of one single enemy.  This will have political consequences both within (1) and outside the DRC (2).

1. The irresistible fall of President Kabila        

Contrary to what intuition might suggest, President Kabila will not benefit from the military defeat of the M23. Indeed, President Kabila has allowed the international community to fill the legitimacy gap that his administration has faced even before his contested re-election in 2011. Moreover, President Kabila has not learned from former President Laurent Gabgo and has used the ICC as a tool to remove his opponents like Jean-Pierre Bemba. During his 12 years in office, Joseph Kabila has also amassed a considerable wealth, which anyone in DRC will be happy to remove from him. In short, Kabila is now in the waiting room of the ICC, if he stays in the office until 2016. One can say thus without exaggeration that President Kabila is already imprisoned in the trap he used for others.

The M23 was like the tree hiding the forest for Joseph Kabila, his legacy cannot withstand the lightest test of accountability while he has allowed the international community to try and test the tools to remove him from office.

2.   The short-lived unity within the International community

International relations are as we know defined by interests, the M23 had allowed the international community to articulate the complex interests posed by the DRC in terms of oil, minerals, and influence in one single issue: a small group of mountaineers called the M23. Now that this group is about to disappear in the thick jungle of the Kivu, the international community will slowly but surely disintegrate into the status quo ante: The United States new Ambassador for the Great Lakes will signify other players that the choirmaster, France will ascertain her ascendance to the biggest francophone country in the world, South Africa and Tanzania will cash in their contributions while Angola won’t allow anyone of these African henchmen to get an overdose of Congo fever.

It is true, for the midterm MONUSCO will legitimize its presence not through nation building programs but by scaring everyone:  the Rwandans are coming! Of course, MONUSCO will also become an expert in monitoring the sufferance of Congolese people by pointing at Kigali. This will allow MONUSCO to prolong its mandate despite the absence of M23 by simply remaining in the news; Rwanda bashing sells.

The M23 will not completely disappear, they will become like any other rebellion in DRC: they will simply be there without political or territorial ambitions; lightly armed they will constitute another armed group within the new old Somalia that is DRC. There will be some drones flying around to influence a low scale war, with a bit of luck for the local population, Al Shabaab will open up a branch in Kivu; only then maybe, will the big powers defining the international community have a common enemy with the region.