After M23 what’s next?

Commentators on the recent events in the Eastern DRC have been quick to announce the end of M23, only few however have analyzed the potential consequences. This contribution aims to fill this gap by asking after M23, what’s next? The End of M23 also means the diffusion of one single enemy.  This will have political consequences both within (1) and outside the DRC (2).

  1. The irresistible fall of President Kabila        

Contrary to what intuition might suggest, President Kabila will not benefit from the military defeat of the M23. Indeed, President Kabila has allowed the international community to fill the legitimacy gap that his administration has faced even before his contested re-election in 2011. Moreover, President Kabila has not learned from former President Laurent Gabgo and has used the ICC as a tool to remove his opponents like Jean-Pierre Bemba. During his 12 years in office, Joseph Kabila has also amassed a considerable wealth, which anyone in DRC will be happy to remove from him. In short, Kabila is now in the waiting room of the ICC, if he stays in the office until 2016. One can say thus without exaggeration that President Kabila is already imprisoned in the trap he used for others.

The M23 was like the tree hiding the forest for Joseph Kabila, his legacy cannot withstand the lightest test of accountability while he has allowed the international community to try and test the tools to remove him from office.

2.   The short-lived unity within the International community

International relations are as we know defined by interests, the M23 had allowed the international community to articulate the complex interests posed by the DRC in terms of oil, minerals, and influence in one single issue: a small group of mountaineers called the M23. Now that this group is about to disappear in the thick jungle of the Kivu, the international community will slowly but surely disintegrate into the status quo ante: The United States new Ambassador for the Great Lakes will signify other players that the choirmaster, France will ascertain her ascendance to the biggest francophone country in the world, South Africa and Tanzania will cash in their contributions while Angola won’t allow anyone of these African henchmen to get an overdose of Congo fever.

It is true, for the midterm MONUSCO will legitimize its presence not through nation building programs but by scaring everyone:  the Rwandans are coming! Of course, MONUSCO will also become an expert in monitoring the sufferance of Congolese people by pointing at Kigali. This will allow MONUSCO to prolong its mandate despite the absence of M23 by simply remaining in the news; Rwanda bashing sells.

The M23 will not completely disappear, they will become like any other rebellion in DRC: they will simply be there without political or territorial ambitions; lightly armed they will constitute another armed group within the new old Somalia that is DRC. There will be some drones flying around to influence a low scale war, with a bit of luck for the local population, Al Shabaab will open up a branch in Kivu; only then maybe, will the big powers defining the international community have a common enemy with the region.

HRW Report on alleged Rwandan support to M23

The recent Report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) on the alleged support of Rwanda to the M23 is yet another confirmation on how dangerous it is to let private corporate interests set the agenda in international relations. The report is solely based on testimonies collected among the poorest people on earth, while it is known that HRW pays for testimonies to push its own agenda. It is thus unsurprising that the report is full of inadequacies and contradictions. Below is a summary of the report with some initial comments highlighting a dangerous trend of warmongering international non-state actors perpetuating an economy of war to raise funds. Who will watch the self-styled watchers?

Proposed sanctions against Rwanda vs. proposed sanctions against DRC

De facto HRW proposes sanctions amounting to suspension of development aid to Rwanda:

  • donor governments should publicly denounce continuing Rwandan support to the M23 and call for sanctions against senior Rwandan officials responsible for backing the armed group
  • Suspend donor assistance to the Rwandan military

HRW does not propose international sanction against the government of DRC, rather it suggests:

  • The Congolese government should immediately suspend, investigate, and prosecute as appropriate Congolese military officers and government officials who have provided support to the FDLR or allied groups.
  • The government should make clear that abusive militia commanders will not be integrated into Congo’s army as part of any political settlement

In short, HRW says that the Rwandan Government and Defense Forces, known for development and peacekeeping unparalleled achievements be blacklisted; while the notorious corrupt DRC government and criminal FARDC are just reminded to clean up their house. This alone shows the bias of HRW, one also understand why HRW so desperately wants to link Somalia and Darfour to DRC. HRW wants to discredit Rwanda as peacekeeping force: as if going to Darfur is a training ground for DRC. It remains a well kept secret how marginalizing Rwanda will bring DRC at peace instead of further destabilizing the region.

Crimes committed by M23 and RDF to force recruitment

On the one hand, HRW alleges the large scale support by Rwanda Defense Forces to M23, on the other hand it alleges that M23 commits crimes while forcibly recruiting. How can M23 be assisted by Rwanda Defence Forces and at the same time necessitate to forcibly recruit villagers and children of no use to fight against professional armies of  MONUSCO, Tanzania and South Africa in a conflict that is so exposed in the media like Eastern DRC?

Torture to find armory of FARDC

It is public knowledge that M23 has captured large amounts of weapons and ammunition in Goma and  Rumangabo. Corrupt FARDC officers also sell weapons to rebels. Why would one torture children, who don’t know anything of strategic importance to get what is easily available through other means?

RDF officers serve in M23 to get higher ranks in RDF once they return to Rwanda

The training and subsequent promotion of RDF officers is transparent and actually involves international and regional players, as RDF Cadet courses and Command Staff College is attained by officers from neighboring countries and involves partnerships with the UN and other countries. RDF Officers are amongst the most experienced serving officers in the region, with their legendary background, they surely don’t want to promote officers made in DRC, a country that has never had an army worth its name.

Infusing minority complex amongst Congolese

HRW uses its large audience to spread hate speech:  alleging that Rwandans never miss an opportunity to tell Congolese ‘you are worth nothing’ aim at cementing deep rooted hatred  amongst Congolese. It is directly borrowed from genocide ideology that had portrayed Tutsi as arrogant and others as eternal passive people suffering from a minority complex: on the one hand you have the ‘agent provocateur’ (Tutsi) on the other hand the typical nigger without attitude (Hutu, Congolese). This is a very dangerous trend confirming a trend of heating up ethnic tensions in the region by simplifying governance and geopolitical problems into ethnic hate speech.

Forcing civilians to transport weapons

HRW alleges that RDF has forced civilians in Rwanda and DRC to transport supplies to the front while at the same time alleging large scale cross-border truck transports. Why would anyone risk using civilians when trucks are available?

Recommendation:

No recommendation on solving the conflict politically is provided, instead HRW strong recommendation coming out several times in the report ‘to ensure that any settlement between the Congolese government and the M23 excludes integration into the Congolese army of M23 leaders’. This amounts to an extremist position based on a zero-sum game between the belligerents. Even the Congolese President has reached Kinshasa via a rebellion and the FARDC is a patchwork of rebellions, the assumption of a regular army vs. a rebellion cannot withstand scrutiny. In any case, even if tomorrow M23 no longer exists, there would still be FDLR and other rebellions, Kinshasa will not have a functioning police, army and administration to impose law and order, back to square one!

Unsurprisingly, HRW does not say anything on how to help Congolese, how to settle disputes and which political arrangement can be made to make sure the current crisis is not wasted again. For sure HRW is not for peace, but is looking forward to a conflict to continue  its narcissistic fundraising. DRC is a subcontinent without functioning institutions attracting every power on earth but also all sorts of armed groups including genocide fugitives. This situation does not call for NGOs navel-gazing propaganda but visionary elected leaders from different countries. How many deaths does the intentional community need to stop caricaturing the geopolitics of the Great Lakes Region?

The inter-national blindspot in the crisis of Eastern DRC

Friends and foe of Rwanda agree that peace in DRC, especially in the East, passes through Rwanda. Friends of Rwanda argue that the efficiency of Rwanda’s institutions could leverage the geographic and demographic factors linking both Rwanda and Eastern DRC to infuse a positive outcome of the crisis. Indeed, the Eastern part of DRC host a large community of Rwandophones and needs Rwanda to access regional and world markets. Critics of Rwanda say the problems of DRC are caused by Rwanda and the international community should sanction Rwanda whenever Congo is not at peace. This Congo-conditionality is currently being administered to Rwanda. Both positions are actually grounded on an assumption that needs to be nuanced: the Rwanda factor in the eastern part of DRC is more a people’s question than an international one. The current disarray in the international politics on DRC is explained by the fact that the international community is ill-equipped in dealing with a problem that is not inter-national. This blind-spot has deadly consequences for the communities on the ground.

1.     The blindness of the international community towards  people’s rights

The inter-national community is blind to a people’s driven agenda. The fight for African self-determination was aborted by the AU insistence on colonial borders without providing for strong regional institutions. Yet colonial borders are deadly straightjackets, they were drawn based on a rationale of exploitation. Moreover, the indigenous institutions left by the colonial administration were auxiliary of that exploitation and continued to draw their legitimacy in western capitals rather than within their constituency, considered as backward.  It is without surprise that Africa is home to failed States.

Currently, the population of Eastern DRC with a large community of Rwandophones is perceived to be non-existent in their own right. The only way they are perceived by the international community is through the prism of the nation of Rwanda. Whatever happens in Eastern DRC now is linked to Rwanda, yet the problems call for a regional solution than a nation-centered one. Alternatively, the population of Eastern DRC is linked to the nation of DRC, if it accepts the status of all citizens in DRC: being citizens of a failed State without functioning institutions for security and welfare. The problem is that unlike Congolese in other parts of the DRC, absent institutions for Congolese in the East means direct threats of massacres and massive rape. In other words, the status quo is not tenable, thus the flaring up of conflicts every now and then.

The international community has reacted to this untenable status quo with the largest peacekeeping mission ever, but its blindness towards governance issues has led to trench warfare with various armed groups instead of providing answers to the people’s legitimate aspirations towards peace, security and development.

Regardless of any position on the current situation in Eastern DRC, the situation consists of a continent-country without institutions to protect civilians. In this context, the international community has confined its role in monitoring human rights violations with questionable expertise and objectivity, at occasion the international community actually committed human rights violations.

2.     The ICC as accelerator of conflict

The international community has become part of the problem since it seeks to antagonize concerned administrations within the region without providing for an alternative. Such an alternative would consist of mechanisms to deal with the underlying issues in DRC: absence of institutions to protect and promote development. Instead, the UN Security Council has abandoned state-building reforms in favor of the magic stick of the ICC.

Ironically, the ICC has been justified by the failure of the world in preventing genocide in Rwanda, yet bad governance is what caused genocide in Rwanda not the absence of a tribunal. As one of the most distinguished professor in constitutional law once said, lawyers have no role in revolutions. A legal system, however international, cannot govern the world. A legal system does not mean legitimacy on its own, legitimacy and thus the absence of a conflict is grounded in the will of the people. The current application of ICC politics to conflicts of the world reverses the French Revolution that has institutionalized the will of the people as basis of governance and the post-1945 understanding that power is limited by human rights.

For the apolitical proponents of the ICC, human rights form the basis of power and the will of the people can be ignored to impose an ICC warrant for example. Yet for that to be true, the application of sanctions against human rights violations would have to be universal and not selective. Otherwise, the ICC would be driven by a sectarian political will rather than by the universality of human rights.

Additionally, justice cannot be pronounced in a political vacuum, justice is being pronounced in the name of the people. The current insistence on arresting Bosco Ntanganda has triggered a domino effect with more war than peace, for what is at stake goes beyond his individual responsibility. What is at the stake is to know how security can be achieved in the Eastern part of DRC. As long as there is neither national nor international force able to protect civilians in East DRC there will be people like Bosco Ntaganda. DRC needs institutions to monopolize the legitimate forms of violence.

This does not mean that East Congo should seek secession. Even a secessionist State would have to come to the sobering conclusion that State building does not occur overnight and that the support of the international community is crucial. There is no magic solution for East Congo, but any solution would need to withstand the following test: How does it affect the people in East DRC?

3.     Prioritizing State-building reforms

The international community has sought to impose an arrest warrant at all costs, ignoring the firepower of those who consider that the priority is not arresting Ntaganda but what substantiate his political existence. In doing so, it has chosen a self-flattering initiative over the interests of the population in East DRC. One could blame Ntaganda for making his arrest so costly, the truth is however that the international community has continued to issue arrests warrants against leaders of his community making it clear that they should accept being killed and raped within the institutional vacuum of East DRC or fight for survival. It is this international blindness towards what politically can bring peace and development that is proving to be lethal for the population in East Congo. In a study done by the London School of Economics and PriceWaterhouseCoopers on how donors can avoid doing harm and maximize their positive impact in fragile situations, the authors alludes to this blind spot: ‘Less understood among donors is the extent to which the state’s legitimacy is bolstered by the political reorganisation championed by government’. This study shows how Rwanda was able to recover from the abyss by working with development partners to restore State efficiency. This is what should inform any solution to the crisis in East Congo, what policies are going to establish State efficiency?

In November 2011, countries emerging from conflict met in Kigali under the auspice of the Peace building Commission of the UN, they declared State Building to be the other side of the peace medal. Unfortunately, for the people in East Congo, State Building is not so prone to media attraction like the business of humanitarian interventions.

The recent crisis in Eastern Congo: a case for regionalism

Like other parts of Africa, the great lakes region has been shaped by the colonial legacy with communities sharing the same culture living in different countries. The only way African countries can deal with this colonial legacy is through regional integration. Unfortunately, the international community has adopted a wrong approach in dealing with a problem of its own making. With disastrous consequences within countries and the region, the international community has gone against the best practice of regional solutions to global challenges through direct crisis management. However, the direct crisis management by the international community is marked by a poor analysis on the root causes of conflict in DRC and will thus not yield any results.

  1. The jurisdiction over the Democratic Republic of Congo

The situation in eastern DRC is increasingly analyzed through the prism of Rwanda, the difference in governance of the two countries are worlds apart, as often described by travelers, differences are to be seen just by crossing the border: at the one hand one of the most corrupt country with the worst performance in human development index (DRC). At the other hand one of Africa’s least corrupt country, 12% poverty reduction in five years, on track of all MDGs and a model of post-conflict nation building (Rwanda).

This lack of governance within the DRC is treated like a constant variable by international actors who prefer not to address the complex questions of governance. Instead, they analyze the problems in DRC through the prism of her neighboring countries, especially Rwanda. Unknowingly, this approach equals to an extension of Rwanda’s jurisdiction to the Eastern part of DRC. In other words, international actors deny Congo’s sovereignty by constantly excusing her from her sovereign rights and duties.

Ironically this extension of Rwanda’s jurisdiction is done by the same people accusing Rwanda of interfering within the DRC. Hence the paradoxical call from the international community: ‘Rwanda should play a positive role in solving the conflict within the DRC’, in other words Rwanda should be involved in the DRC. How should Rwanda demonstrate she is not interfering in the DRC by getting involved?

The extension of Rwanda’s sovereignty to DRC is argumentatively backed by an ethnic approach to sovereignty: Since eastern DRC is Rwandophone, whatever happens there is also Rwanda’s responsibility. If transposed to the rest of Africa, this would have disastrous consequences: whatever the people from Mali are doing in Ivory Coast is Mali’s responsibility. Another variation would also be that since the Kenyan Prime Minister is a Luo, whatever the Luos are doing in Uganda is Kenya’s responsibility. We would end in a medieval order with fragmented ethnic leaders, a curious version of ‘divide and rule’ promoted by the same powers that have created national borders where Africans saw fluid regions.

  1. Transnational resources

The focus of Rwanda is a tree hiding complex issues of internal and regional governance. DRC is home to transnational resources including gas, oil and fisheries. Rwanda shares with the DRC the methane gas of the Lake Kivu, which will be jointly exploited through the Economic Community of the Great Lakes. But Rwanda is frequently being accused of exploiting the minerals in DRC, however it is the only country that has adopted mineral tagging in the region. Rwanda upsurge as mining exporter is explained by a dormant mining sector until recently. Before the 1994 genocide only one company was monopolizing the sector in Rwanda, after the privatization a boom in the three strategic minerals has unfolded (Tin, Tungsten, and Tantalum occurring in the Coltan mineral).  Against this background, DRC is currently in dispute with all her neighboring countries over transnational resources as a recent report by the International Crisis Group indicates. The report entitled Black Gold in the Congo: Threat to Stability or Development Opportunity? Countries published in July 2012, accounts of current conflicts between DRC, Angola, Burundi, Tanzania and Uganda over oil reserves.  How come the United States member of the NATO and NAFTA and the countries forming the EU are not supporting the ICGLR, when all of these powers avoided the zero-sum game competition among nation-States through regionalism? Is peace the aim in DRC or the promotion of zero-sum game between DRC and her neighbors, especially Rwanda?

The discovery of oil in the hinterland of DRC against the background of Kinshasa’s orientation towards China might explain the aggressive common tone expressed by Western countries. There is a new scramble for Africa and blame-shifting the problem of DRC to Rwanda, a country 80 smaller, seems to be motivated by a desire to rationalize the conflict. As European diplomats often say, there is no counterpart to talk to in the DRC, thus there is no way to influence the DRC, it is a chaos. The only way to influence the DRC is to drag in a rational acting actor by extending its jurisdiction as seen above. Rwanda is being forced as auxiliary of the West to shape things in DRC. Notably, to consider removing Kabila who is giving long-term concessions to the Chinese.

Unfortunately, the West relies on very poor analysis when it comes to DRC, thus the West cannot consider treating the DRC as a new market once well governed. In view of the West, the DRC is good for cheap minerals and humanitarian interventions. It is in this context that the myth of external aggression to the DRC has emerged, although it is obvious that the DRC is a threat to herself without external assistance.

  1. The futility of external support

In actual fact, the DRC is a country with an administration unable to exercise authority over its territory and people. Looking at all indicators, the sovereign in DRC, its people have resisted its leadership whenever the occasion for a vote of confidence arose. The FARDC is an army that deserts at any operation which indicates the lack of trust in the commander in chief. The last presidential election was not recognized and post-election violence followed the proclamation of the results, the election was even contested by the Catholic Church.

The mainstreamed corruption is also an indication of a lack of faith in national institutions. This has direct consequences on the battlefield. Officers steal the pay of their soldiers and food is scarce. The faits d’armes of the congolese army chiefs are telling: the former army chief Gen. Amisi was supplying arms to rebels, including FDLR,  the current one is an experienced bar tender.

In a nutshell FARDC is fighting a mutiny of battle hardened Eastern Congolese in their own stronghold without pay or reliable supply chain. Needless to say that it is a lost battle, especially given  the presence of FDLR, M23 fears nothing less than extermination. To make matters worse, the indictments of the ICC do not incentivize any rebel leader to lay down the arms. In view of this situation, it is evident that M23 does not need support to defeat militarily the FARDC.

  1. The significance of war in Eastern DRC

Given the structural inability of FARDC to fight, Kinshasa has made the choice of a media war against M23 grounded on legitimacy. The idea being that M23 cannot survive without international recognition. This strategy would have been successful, if Kinshasa would have used the media war as a bargaining tool against M23. However, Kinshasa refused to talk to M23. This deadlock motivates in turn M23 to seek for an incontestable status through military means. What currently prevent a large scale war between M23 and mercenaries hired by Kinshasa including FDLR, to replace FADRC, are the regional peace negotiations under the auspices of the international conference on the Great Lakes Region. One can only wonder why the UN and its European powers are so reluctant to support this initiative.

One reason behind the lack of support to a regional solution is that it would prevent former colonial powers like Belgium to free ride on the conflict in Eastern Congo in view of recovering international appeal. With prolonged economic crisis in the West, such an international prestige is needed to convince an increasingly skeptical electorate. Equally, the UN fears a loss of raison d’être, if ICGLR proves to be more useful than the 1 billion USD heavy MONUSCO, whose mandate’s renewal always surprisingly coincidences with renewed fighting in DRC. Indeed, any neutral observer analyzing the M23 crisis and other would find a strange pattern: always before June, when the 1 billion question is going to be asked at the UN Security Council, the MONUSCO finds ways to publish a report blaming Rwanda and insists at asking Kinshasa to implement policies with conflictual ending. With tax free salaries up to 200 000$ car of 75 000 rent of 5000 $ the UN staff on the ground informing the world have no incentive for peace.

In view of the above, the international community and the government in Kinshasa have a stake in prolonged conflict in Eastern DRC. Against conventional wisdom, Rwanda has stubbornly refused to be dragged into this war. Lazy analysts blinded by ethnicity ignore that if Rwanda was really militarily supporting M23, than M23 would be at the doors of Kinshasa. Indeed, Rwanda has never been shy to admit being military involved in Congo.

Neither the UN nor western powers are willing to sacrifice troops by intervening in a guerilla war in the deep forests of the DRC. Only countries in the region would see an intervention as prevention against threats to their national security. However, countries from the region will avoid to be dragged into this conflict on a large scale, since this would make them responsible for a situation only Congolese can address. Thus, war will not solve the real issues at hand, in the words of President Kagame ‘you cannot shoot your way into a solution’.

  1. Impunity of transnational non  state actors  

Interestingly, the recent DRC crisis is said to have been provoked by the quest to end impunity.  The international Criminal Court sought to exercise its jurisdiction over the DRC by calling for the arrest of Gen. Ntaganda. One can note already here, that one of the enforcement mechanisms of the ICC is to wage a war and freeze aid, in other words terrorizing millions of people who never met Ntaganda.  In procedural terms, this pill is administered through the corporate veil of non-state actors such as a Group of Expert report or Human Rights Watch, since it goes against rules and practices of inter-states cooperation. In a very interesting article by Alan Chong posted in the Review of International Studies in October 2002, this reality in foreign policy is being described as ‘plus non-state politics’ or ‘multi-actor reality’. The problem however, is that the new corporate actors in global affairs are neither elected nor held responsible for the mayhem they cause. As Alan Chong rightfully asks, ‘Yet, one wonders what the implications are of displacing the pre-existing foreign policy mandate of states, grounded in domestic systems of legality, however determined as opposed to self-appointed transnational crusaders of conscience’.

Ironically, it is the privilege of the weak to share the ringside seat of the winds of change with the powerful: Non-State Actors are aggressively advancing ‘causes of conscience and normative ideals’ on Africa (NGOs) and on powerful western countries alike (religious hegemony). Like in the old days of the civilization mission by European countries, moralism is invoked to put established principles of international affairs out of order and to impose on other societies an agenda defined in the opaque headquarters of transnational corporations (kandhar or New York).  This is not an argument for cultural relativism; rather it is an appeal against cultural imperialism, the root cause of international wars since it denies freedom in the name of morality. In that respect Al Quaeda Inc is not so different from Human Rights Watch and ICC, in the sense that in the name of moral all hell can break lose.

In a globalized world with instant communication, countries cannot leave the power of setting the international agenda, war or peace, to Non-State Actors that never have to bear the burden of governance. As a Rwandan proverb goes, Ingoma ntihora irahaka (power cannot have a private purpose). The solution for a post Westphalian order of nation-states is a world of regions and there is no better place for regionalism than Africa, the continent with European borders imprisoning growth and innovation.

It is obvious that Rwanda can only achieve a free movement of people, goods and capital in her relations with the DRC through peace. Rwanda does not need war to enforce what geography already has provided for. How come then Rwanda is labeled as war monger? It has more to do with the image moral crusaders have created to fund-raise and set their own agenda. This image describes the Great-Lakes region as passive agent at the mercy of Rwanda, the root of all evils.  Targeting Rwanda is convenient for lazy analysts who find an organized State they can punch into instead of the complexities of the continent-country that is DRC. While this NGO generated world view might be complaisant to a West with a complex of moral superiority, it does not augur well on the long term.  China is at Africa’s door with no other message than trade with a sovereign agenda resilient to partisan interests. It is evident that the West risks losing the continent of growth, by viewing it only as a playground for its non-for-profit but power-hungry moral crusaders. A power which they exercised in the last century without empowering the African citizen they claim to fight for.